Global Production Networks and Information Technology: The Case of Taiwan by Shin-Horng Chen
The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center
in 1960 to foster mutual understanding and coopera-
tion among the governments and peoples of the
Asia Pacific region including the United States.
Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. govern-
ment with additional support provided by private
agencies, individuals, corporations, and Asian and
Pacific governments.
East-West Center Working Papers are circulated for
comment and to inform interested colleagues about
work in progress at the Center.
For more information about the Center or to order
publications, contact:
Publication Sales Office
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601
Telephone: 808-944-7145
Facsimile: 808-944-7376
Email: ewcbooks@EastWestCenter.org
Website: www.EastWestCenter.org 	
 

	 


No. 46, May 2002
	


	



Shin-Horng Chen
Shin-Horng Chen is the Deputy Director of the International
Division, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
This paper will appear in Industry and Innovation, Vol. 9 No. 2
(August), Special Issue, "Global Production Networks, Informa-
tion Technology and Local Capabilities." Dieter Ernst and Linsu
Kim (guest editors).
East-West Center Working Papers: Economics Series is an
unreviewed and unedited prepublication series reporting on
research in progress. The views expressed are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Center. Please direct
orders and requests to the East-West Center's Publication Sales
Office. The price for Working Papers is $3.00 each plus postage.
For surface mail, add $3.00 for the first title plus $0.75 for each
additional title or copy sent in the same shipment. For airmail
within the U.S. and its territories, add $4.00 for the first title
plus $0.75 for each additional title or copy in the same
shipment. For airmail elsewhere, add $7.00 for the first title plus
$4.00 for each additional title or copy in the same shipment. 
1. Introduction 
Ever since the 1980s, the information industry has increasingly become the engine of 
economic growth in Taiwan; however, whilst progressive development of the information 
sector is being widely experienced throughout the world, Taiwan’s information industry 
has outgrown the majority of its international counterparts.  On a worldwide scale, Taiwan 
currently ranks as the third largest producer of information products and Taiwan’s 
characteristic feature of local industrial clustering has already been well-documented 
(Hobday, 1995; Kim and Tunzelmann, 1998; Kraemer, et al., 1996).  Nevertheless, it is 
becoming increasingly evident that globalization is reshaping the way in which the 
information industry is organized globally, consequently, local agglomeration can no 
longer adequately account for the dynamics of Taiwan’s information industry. Rather, it is 
global production networks that have come to the fore. This has something to do with the 
changing strategies of brand marketers, particularly in the US. In response to this, 
information product manufacturers in Taiwan have ‘gone global’ to deploy their 
production networks – and more recently logistics networks – so as to maintain their cost 
efficiency in order to better serve their customers.   
Similarly, from its inception, the development of Taiwan’s IC industry was driven by a 
strategy of vertical disintegration, which in turn, facilitated the formation of local and 
cross-border linkages as the momentum for industrial expansion.  Moreover, the 
emergence of system-on-a-chip (SOC – to be further explained below) will probably lead 
to further vertical disintegration within the industry. This will give rise to the important 
question of how Taiwanese firms manage to ensure their inter-organizational and 
cross-border linkages function so smoothly. An obvious explanation lies in the application of information technology (IT) because it enables real-time information flows and 
functional coordination across organizational and national boundaries.  
We therefore find ourselves with two sets of interrelated questions. First of all, what are 
the features of the global production networks in which the Taiwanese firms are involved; 
and how do these Taiwanese firms position themselves within the global production 
networks in order to acquire market niches and indispensable capabilities? Secondly, in 
what way can IT be used to facilitate Taiwanese firms’ participation in the global 
production networks; and how can IT strengthen these Taiwanese firms’ position within 
these networks? This paper sets out to explore these issues in the context of industrial 
structure and its effects on inter-firm relationships.  
The analysis proceeds in four stages. First of all, taking into account the features of 
certain technologies and globalization, Section 2 discusses the importance of inter-firm 
linkages and the emergence of global production and knowledge networks. The role of IT 
in global production networks is also discussed briefly. Section 3 undertakes an analysis of 
the way in which IT production and application interact within global networks, followed 
in Section 4 by an examination of the personal computer (PC) and integrated chip (IC) 
industries. Each section incorporates an in-depth case study as a means of elaborating on 
the points made. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with an examination of the 
potential implications. 
2.  Globalization and the Development of Global Production Networks 
In a departure from the standard economic theory with its tendency to portray firms as 
vertically integrated, cross-country industries are increasingly linking up along the value 
chain and across industrial boundaries. On the one hand, the standard economic theory, to a 
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other hand, the cross-border linkage of firms has increasingly arisen largely as a direct 
result of globalization. In order to elaborate on our first point, it is useful to refer to 
Schumpeter’s discussion on the relationship between technological innovation and 
industrial organization. Widely publicized is Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative 
destruction’, which tends to champion the cause of small technological firms or innovative 
entrepreneurs in challenging both large established firms and existing technologies based 
on radical technological breakthroughs. In contrast to the above ‘Mark I’ scenario, 
Schumpeter (1942) recognized that established firms may be in a better position to 
appropriate new knowledge by means of devices such as patents, secrecy, lead times and 
superior sales efforts. As a result, there is a ‘Mark II’ scenario that is characterized by high 
market concentration and the continuing existence of large established firms. 
However, the Mark I/Mark II analysis fails to capture the complexity of technology and 
its effects on industrial structure, particularly in the area of IT. As argued by Windrum 
(1999), innovations such as e-commerce involve technical systems that are inherently large, 
comprising of a set of jointly-consumed interdependent products. Because of network 
effects and product compatibility, successful innovations for technical systems entail 
intensive interfaces between multiple actors with different knowledge and skills bases, 
termed as ‘innovation networks’. By implication, not only does such innovation often 
result from the collective efforts of inter-related firms, but it also demonstrates that the 
value chain does not need to be completely internalized within individual firms. Therefore, 
in many cases, industrial competition takes place between rival technological and 
production networks that contain a multiplicity of differentiated firms, rather than between 
vertically integrated oligopolists. However, the relevant literature tends to focus mainly on 
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and Mytelka, 1998), whilst downplaying the role played by firms in countries such as 
Taiwan. 
In addition, the trend towards globalization is reshaping the landscape of industrial 
competition. One aspect of globalization over the last few decades has been the increasing 
disintegration of capabilities in production, and even innovation, across nations (Freenstra, 
1998). Driven by this disintegration, the outreach of multinationals takes the form not only 
of direct investment, but also outsourcing of production, and even knowledge.  As a result, 
boundaries between firms have become blurred on an international scale  (Delapierre and 
Mytelka, 1998), which has eroded the basis for the formation of traditional oligopolies.  
Instead, industrial rivalry now tends to occur amongst industrial networks comprising of a 
multiplicity of firms linked up with different knowledge bases. Although the driving seat is 
occupied mainly by well-established firms in the advanced nations of the world, firms in 
countries such as Taiwan also have a role to play.   
Against this background, offshore sourcing is increasingly being adopted by many 
American firms – and more recently by Japanese firms – in their efforts to come to terms 
with the new global industrial dynamics (Chen and Ku, 2000; Kotabe, 1996; Swamidass 
and Kotabe, 1993; Venkatesan, 1992). In this regard, many brand marketers tend to 
concentrate their core competencies on brand name resources and R&D, whilst 
outsourcing the remainder of the value chain. As a result, having traditionally been 
considered as vertically integrated multinationals, they are increasingly becoming 
hollowing-out corporations (Kotabe, 1989).  
On the other hand, a new breed of multinationals has emerged, such as Contract 
Electronics Manufacturers (CEMs). CEM companies, unlike the more traditional 
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instead global networks with fast-response capabilities to provide production and other 
(mainly logistics) services to brand marketers. By the same token, Taiwan’s PC industry 
has evolved from a local production network towards a global one. 
In a comparison with the PC industry, global production networks may mean 
something different for the IC industry; nevertheless, the essence remains the same. By 
disintegrating the IC value chain, the initial emergence of foundry services in Taiwan 
facilitated the proliferation of small- and medium-sized firms engaged in other market 
segments, such as IC design, testing and packaging, leading to a vertically disintegrated 
industrial structure. Moreover, the emergence of SOC has induced the modularization of 
various design technologies, known as silicon intellectual properties (SIPs), which can be 
used repetitively as the main building block for SOC. This trend has given rise to ‘chipless’ 
IC firms, acting as pure providers of SIP without owning a fab, or even a chip, leading to 
further disintegration of the industry (TSMC, 2000). As a result, IC design and production 
has come to resemble SIP assembly (see Appendix Figure 1). 
Although most SIPs are owned by integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), fabless 
firms – and increasingly, chipless foundry service providers – are the natural places to 
verify the value and ‘fabricability’ of SIPs. Therefore, in order to go through the entire 
value chain, the industry is required to bring together a variety of industry players, 
including chipless firms, design service providers, IC designers, electronic design aid 
(EDA) tool providers and foundry and packaging firms, who are likely to be located across 
nations. The production networks in the industry are hence global, or at least international, 
in nature.  
We then come to the question of the role of IT in these global production networks. IT 
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and inter-organizational value chain management in a real-time and cost effective manner 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000). The use of IT in conjunction with the reshuffling of 
business models can help firms to achieve speed and flexibility in an industry where time is 
critical (Kraemer, et al., 2000). In this regard, IT is more than a transaction facilitator, and 
in fact, is promoted as being an enabling technology for collaborative commerce amongst 
firms, involving not only inter-organizational coordination of the supply chain but also 
cooperation in product definition, design and R&D (Berryman and Heck, 2001). In this 
way, production networks in the ‘bricks and mortar’ world may be transformed into virtual 
supply networks and collaborative communities. This is not to suggest that industrial 
advantages derived from the physical world will become dispensable, but rather, as will be 
shown below, that they can go hand in hand with IT applications to bolster the prospects of 
the firms involved. 
3.  Global Logistics and IT - The PC Industry 
In 1999, Taiwan was the world’s third largest producer of PC-related products, with a 
significant number of Taiwanese-made products such as motherboards, scanners, monitors 
and notebook computers, enjoying a healthy global market share.  Taiwan’s characteristic 
local industrial clusters and their role in the growth of the PC industry in Taiwan have been 
well scrutinized (Hobday, 1995; Kawakami, 1996; Kraemer et al., 1996), but local 
agglomeration alone can no longer adequately account for the dynamics of Taiwan’s PC 
industry, because whilst global production networks have come to the fore, the way in 
which the global PC industry is organised has changed.   
In this regard, an important milestone in the development of Taiwan’s PC industry was 
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was initially directed towards Southeast Asia, but more recently towards mainland China 
and elsewhere in the world. The offshore production of Taiwan-based PC firms grew from 
US$973 million in 1992 to US$18.86 billion in 1999, which at that time, represented 47.29 
percent of total production. It follows that the volume of export orders received by local 
firms has increasingly diverged from their actual exports.  According to our observations, 
the divergence widened significantly in 1997, which had to do with the changing role of 
Taiwanese firms in the global production network (Chen and M.C. Liu, 2000). 
The PC industry’s drive towards the reduction of lead-time to market, along with lower 
production and inventory costs, brought about a profound change in the manufacturing 
system and inter-firm competition within the industry. It became commonplace for 
components to be sourced from a global network of suppliers and for final assembly to be 
undertaken in the end-market (Angel and Engstrom, 1995; Borrus and Borrus, 1997). More 
specifically, major brand marketers moved to adopt outsourcing and order-based 
production, which greatly rationalised their global supply chain, hence altering their 
contractual relationships with Taiwanese firms. Compaq, for example, pioneered the 
so-called ‘optimized distribution model’ which, in essence, was aimed at allowing 
customers to choose what they wanted, when and how, at the lowest prices. There are three 
facets to this operational model. Firstly, in order to narrow the gap between supply and 
demand, production must be ‘build-to-order’ (BTO), based on meeting orders, rather than 
forecasts.  Secondly, in order to meet the wide variety of consumer demands, producers 
must not only build-to-order but also configure-to-order, making customised products in 
specific quantities. Thirdly, vendors must undertake final assembly, bringing together a set 
of subassemblies produced and delivered by subcontractors. Compaq imposes a ‘98-3’ 
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components and parts needed for production within 3 days of the order and to ship the 
product within six days of receipt of the order.   
Such contractual arrangements with global leaders in the PC industry prompted 
Taiwanese IT firms to upgrade their position within the global production system and these 
firms have subsequently taken on the essential functions of coordinating the global supply 
chain for their OEM customers. For example, under its new business model, Compaq 
outsourced every element of the value chain, with the exception of marketing, to 
Taiwanese subcontractors. By so doing, the company completely handed over its inventory 
costs to these subcontractors, who were also required to produce and deliver sub-system 
products on tight schedules and in tune with the vagaries of market demand. The 
Taiwanese firms had to ensure that everything was synchronised up and down the supply 
chain and in order to do this they had to participate in cross-border supply-chain 
management, logistics operations and after-sales services, coordinating all of these 
functions through the formation of a fast-response global production and logistics network 
or ‘global logistics’ (Chen and Liu 1999; Schive 2000). A case study on Mitac is presented 
below in order to elaborate on these points. 
Mitac International Corporation is one of Taiwan’s leading PC manufacturing services 
companies, producing over 10 million PCs in 2000, and accounting for around 8 per cent of 
global production. In the latest issue of Forbes, Mitac was recognized as the 495th largest 
company in the world, as compared to 607th in 1999, achieving revenues of US$5.274 
billion in 2000. According to the company, its “current remarkable performance can be 
attributed to long-term efforts in areas such as supply chain management, global logistics, 
vertically integrated manufacturing services, as well as aggressive adoption of e-commerce and 
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opportunities”. The firm now maintains manufacturing/assembly sites in Taiwan, mainland 
China, the US, Japan, Belgium and the UK. 
Mitac’s strategic restructuring, with a global logistics and e-commerce flavor, started 
from the early 1990s; however, during 1992 and 1993, the company suffered serious 
deficits because of the oversupply of PC components and parts. Underlying this was the 
inflexibility of the then system-integrated production under one roof in Taiwan, leading to 
overstocking. In response, Mitac pioneered the Modulus Manufacturing System under 
which the PC, as a system, was divided into different moduli to enable fast-food style 
production, the ultimate purpose being ‘build-to-order’ (BTO). Its partnership with 
Compaq, a global leading brand-name marketer, has facilitated Mitac’s large-scale 
deployment of global logistics and e-commerce.  
Mitac has placed significant effort into reconfiguring its international production and 
logistics network in order to serve Compaq’s global operations (see Appendix Figure 2). In 
1998, Mitac began setting up a materials hub in Hsinchu, Taiwan, within which its main 
production site is located. This materials hub stocks parts and components for producing 
barebones, mainly from its own suppliers, who have to bear inventory and warehousing 
costs before Mitac gives a green light for delivery for production. As soon as all the parts 
and components arrive at the production site, they are manufactured into barebones, which 
are then immediately shipped, normally by sea, to overseas assembly sites. As a result of 
this process, Mitac substantially reduces its inventory risks, whilst its suppliers, in return, 
get better payment terms and swifter financing services from Mitac.  
In an effort to meet Compaq’s configure-to-order practices, Mitac has also set up a 
number of configuration hubs close to its overseas assembly sites located in major 
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parts and components such as CPUs and RAMs. The overseas assembly sites undertake the 
final assembly function, bringing together barebones delivered from Mitac’s 
manufacturing sites and key parts and components from configuration hubs. Compaq 
dominates the operation of the configuration hubs, using its bargaining power to gain better 
prices for the key parts and components.  
In addition, Mitac has established a few fulfillment centers in the major market areas in 
order to broaden its value chain. Since price competition has intensified and profit margins 
have narrowed for most mature PC products, Mitac can no longer act as a pure 
manufacturer to sustain its long-term development. By setting up the fulfillment centers, 
Mitac has begun to shoulder the responsibility for after-sales services for Compaq. The 
returns are not only financial, but also technical, because it has helped Mitac to gain direct 
feedback for its product designs and production. 
However, these fulfillment centers are likely to be reduced to after-sales service 
outposts, functioning simply to replace out-of-order parts and components, as Mitac has 
already started to build up a large-scale repair and maintenance plant in mainland China. 
This will help Mitac to utilize the cheap labor available in China without sacrificing the 
quality of its after-sales services and the technical gains already noted.   
Such contractual arrangements also entail progressive deployment of e-commerce 
links between Mitac and its vertical and horizontal counterparts. In fact, it was Compaq’s 
requirement of ‘no electronic data interchange (EDI), no order’ that prompted Mitac to 
embark upon the application of e-commerce. Moreover, a governmental initiative aimed at 
promoting e-commerce links between Taiwanese firms and their international customers 
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1 has facilitated the electronic links 
between Compaq and Mitac (as well as a few other Taiwanese firms) migrating in part 
from an EDI-base to an Internet-base. 
By means of EDI, Mitac is electronically linked with Compaq and its own suppliers. 
Sales forecasts from Compaq are transmitted to Mitac periodically with weekly 
adjustments, termed as a ‘rolling plan’. On this basis, Mitac puts forwards its own 
manufacturing plans, inventory buffering and stock level requirements to its suppliers. 
Following these information flows, Mitac’s international production and logistics networks, 
mentioned above, assume their role in meeting tight production and delivery schedules and 
the variety of market demands. The second phase of the TaiWeb Project (known as the ‘B 
Plan’ Project) will extend the e-commerce applications of all the parties involved from 
supply chain management to other transaction-related activities such as payment and 
warranty services. In addition, Mitac is to develop a ‘virtual’ materials hub mechanism 
over the Internet. The ultimate purpose is to get rid of physical warehouses, eliminating 
inventory costs on both sides of the transaction. This has to be based on strong mutual trust 
and commitment between Mitac and its suppliers. 
Mitac has also set up a Collaborative Product Commerce (CPC) mechanism for online 
joint product design. It incorporates an intra-link that enables all the parties involved to use 
the same design tools for joint product design and development, ranging from product 
definition, to product R&D and product modularization. This not only helps to reduce the 
R&D cycle time for Mitac and its partners, it is also essential to the coordination of the 
production, assembly, delivery and repair and maintenance activities that follow.  
                                                 
1  The TaiWeb Project is a Compaq-centric e-supply chain project, which incorporates advanced and open technology, 
supply chain processes and applications. It involves Taiwanese suppliers such as Mitac, Arima, foxconn, Inventec, 
Quanta, ADI, Compal, Delta and Lite-on and represents Compaq’s first rollout to partners in the Asia-Pacific region.  
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electronically linked both its inter-firm and intra-firm value-chain activities. Over the 
electronics network, multilateral and timely information flows and sharing has, on balance, 
been greatly enhanced, facilitating effective synchronization both up and down the 
inter-organizational and international supply chain. By so doing, Mitac and its partners are 
now involved in design collaboration, commodity management, supplier rationalization 
and supply collaboration which strengthen not only their transaction efficiency but also 
their learning and innovative capabilities.  
A significant change brought about by the global logistics practice, or more specifically, 
BTO, is the substantial increase in the frequency of ordering and hence rising speed of 
delivery. In the past, it took 40 to 60 days for PC firms to go through the entire transaction 
process, from order to delivery. Under BTO, however, subcontractors such as Mitac, have 
to meet a tightened schedule of 5 to 7 days, or even 2 to 3 days. In addition, patchy 
production, instead of mass production, has become the dominant practice. Modular 
manufacturing and IT networking is hence indispensable to Mitac’s formation of a 
rapid-response global production and logistics network. From Taiwan’s perspective, the 
essence of this development is that local IT firms, like Mitac, are transforming from 
stand-alone OEM manufacturers, into providers of integrated service packages 
encompassing a wide range of value-chain activities.  
This development is particularly significant in terms of an often-neglected aspect of 
high-technology manufacturing. High-technology manufacturing industries, like the PC 
industry, are widely regarded as high value-added; however, they tend to be vulnerable to 
accelerating competition and narrowing profit margins even before reaching the mature 
stage of the product life cycle because of the rapid changes in technology. As a result, firms 
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caught up in deteriorating trading terms. In addition, most of Taiwan’s IT firms undertake 
OEM/ODM contract works, without any strong ability to control, or even gain direct 
access to, the final market. Their outreach, by means of moving elements of their 
manufacturing and/or assembly functions overseas, implies that they have to generate 
additional profits through the widening of their value chains. In the case of global logistics, 
they have begun to shoulder service functions such as the coordination of cross-border 
supply chain and logistics, in addition to their initial manufacturing function. It is therefore 
arguable that they have looked beyond manufacturing profits to seek profits from the 
services they provide to brand-name marketers. In fact, a study by the Central Bank in 
Taiwan reveals that global logistics contracting contributed 0.85% to Taiwan’s GDP 
growth in 1999.  
Furthermore, central to global logistics is the subcontractors’ ability to weave together 
the cross-national constituent elements of the value chain into a competitively effective and 
rapidly responsive production and logistics system. This means that they are engaged in the 
rules of the game that industrial competition in the PC industry relies not merely on 
cheaper costs, but more on rapid response capabilities and flexibility. Although Taiwanese 
IT firms are not in the driving seat, they have proved themselves capable of taking part in 
setting up the rules of the game. Therefore, with a global production and logistics network 
at their disposal that is capable of satisfactorily meeting the needs of their customers, 
Taiwan-based IT firms may preempt the entry into the network of their counterparts in 
many countries. As a result, from Taiwan’s point of view, many of the owners of 
world-class PC brand names, which are international core firms in the industry, can be 
‘anchored’ to Taiwan’s economy (Chen and D. Liu, 2000). 
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example, Mitac’s inventory turnover rate increased from 3.53 in 1993 to 12.71 in 1998. At 
the same time, immediately after its materials and configurations hubs were set up, its 
inventory cycle time was reduced substantially from 103.4 days to 30 days. The company 
also managed to achieve Compaq’s 95-5 operation formula targets in 1997 and is well on 
the way to the next milestone, the 98-3 operation formula targets.  
The Mitac experience shows that global logistics and e-commerce need to be 
accompanied by a reshuffling of the business model so that it can come to terms with the 
local firm’s position in the international industrial network and industrial dynamics. The 
business model in question needs to address both internal and external aspects of the 
industrial value chain. Moreover, from their own opinion, whilst reciprocity or mutual 
forbearance is essential to the operation of global logistics, industrial muscle with 
sufficient bargaining power remains indispensable to the negotiation processes involved. 
 
4. Vertical disintegration and Virtual Integration - The IC Industry 
Taiwan’s IC industry is currently the fourth largest in the world, behind only the US, Japan 
and Korea, however, the industry in Taiwan differs from those of the other three in several 
ways. Unlike Korea, which specializes in the production of dynamic random access 
memory (DRAM), Taiwan produces a much wider variety of IC chips whilst also 
dominating in foundry services, capturing around 70 per cent of the global market share. In 
addition, in contrast to the vertically integrated conglomerates dominating the industry in 
Korea and Japan, Taiwan’s IC industry consists of many small firms specialising in a 
narrow range of the value chain, such as IC design, mask production, foundry service, 
packaging and testing.  In fact, Taiwan’s flock of some 127 IC design houses puts it second 
  14 only to the US in terms of the number of companies operating in this segment. In a sense, 
Taiwan’s IC industry is organized as an industrial network system with a strong connection 
to Silicon Valley, the global center of IC technology and the IC market.   
The author has documented elsewhere (Chen and M. Liu, 2000; Chen, Chen and Liu, 
2001) that Taiwan’s IC industry has, to a large extent, come to resemble the scenario of the 
flexible specialization thesis (Piore and Sable, 1984).  In short, fabless IC design houses 
proliferated in Taiwan partly because access to external fabrication capacity lowered the 
barriers to entry into the IC design market. In addition, the concentration of IC and 
computer-related firms in the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park generated 
agglomeration effects that allowed these firms to exploit the benefits of proximity and 
outsourcing. Therefore, even though they specialise in one segment of the value chain or 
another, IC firms in Taiwan are networked by social and business connections. On the other 
hand, it is also evident that Taiwan’s IC industry is closely connected to the industry center 
in Silicon Valley in terms of business and knowledge linkages (ibid.).  Underlying this are 
the trans-Pacific social and business networks (Saxenian, 1997; Kim and Tunzelmann, 
1998) and the similarity of industrial structures between Silicon Valley and Hsinchu   
(Sanxenian, 1997).   
For the purposes of this paper, the author would like to argue further that such industrial 
networking as exists in Taiwan’s IC industry has also benefited from recent innovations in 
IT. Firstly, by reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs involved in purchasing from 
the best outsiders, IT reduces large firms’ advantages of centralized purchasing and 
in-house suppliers. Secondly, technological changes have resulted in smaller production 
runs, increasing the feasibility of product changes and allowing small, specialised firms to 
exploit fragmented product markets on the basis of their flexible response. In addition, the 
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Leading IC firms in Taiwan are championing the concept of the ‘virtual factory’ by 
deploying the Internet and extranet to electronically link with their customers and suppliers. 
The case of TSMC, presented below, helps to shed light on this point. 
TSMC may be regarded as a major catalyst in the abovementioned evolution of the 
industry. The company was created to function as a dedicated foundry service provider, 
simply carrying out contract fabrication work for global customers ranging from start-up 
ventures to world-leading IDMs. Therefore, customer relationship management, as well as 
fabrication capacity and capability, were always central to TSMC’s operations, in which 
e-commerce has come to play an increasingly important role.  
E-business in TSMC started in 1995 with the introduction of Total Order Management 
(TOM) as a tool for bridging supply and demand in fabrication, and for order and 
production scheduling. TSMC has also formed electronic links with its suppliers by 
implementing continuous replenishment programming (CRP) in order to minimize its 
inventory costs; however, these can only be considered as the most basic elements of 
TSMC’s ‘extended’ supply chain management. 
In the ‘arms-length’ relationship between foundries and fabless design houses, it is 
essential to manage the flow of knowledge so as to facilitate a smooth and efficient transfer 
of new designs into production. This has been made possible by the design firm’s 
adherence to ‘design rules’ laid out by the foundry, namely, restrictions on the type of 
designs that will be manufactured in the foundry on a specific delivery schedule. These 
design rules are determined by the foundry’s manufacturing capacity and capability. In 
light of this, foundries such as TSMC have become an essential node of the innovation 
network of new IC designs, which entails close interactions of knowledge and information 
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the ‘virtual fab’ in order to promote virtual integration with its customers by means of 
business-to-business (B2B) applications, thus rendering TSMC as the facilitator of its 
customers’ supply chain management. 
Apart from regular online business transactions, TSMC’s B2B, under a total package of 
‘eFoundry’ covers three major aspects: logistics, engineering and design collaborations 
(see Appendix Figure 3). TSMC’s eFoundry consists of a suite of Internet-based 
applications providing its customers with real-time support in wafer design, engineering 
and logistics, functioning as the master tool for the concept of the virtual fab. It currently 
supports five online services, including TSMC-Online (updated to version 3.0), 
TSMC-Direct, TSMC-YES (Yield Enhancement System), TSMC-ILV (Internet Layout 
Viewer) and eJobView.  
In terms of collaboration in logistics, TSMC-Online provides access to real-time 
production and logistics information updates in areas such as the status of wafer fabrication, 
assembly and testing, as well as order handling and shipping. As for engineering 
collaboration, TSMC-Online provides a variety of engineering capabilities, including 
interactive views of prototyping, lot status, yield analysis and quality reliability data. It is 
also empowered with design collaboration capabilities in support of customer access to 
important information needed during the design process. Aided by Design Service 
Alliance, to which we shall return later, TSMC-Online provides selected blocks of IP 
owned by third parties – these are robust design solutions that conform to TSMC’s 
production technologies – which are then made available to designers.  
For service coverage, TSMC-Direct is similar to TSMC-Online, but whilst the latter is 
open to wider access, since it is Internet-based, the former is a system-to-system and 
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mission-critical information between the ERP systems of TSMC and its customers. 
TSMC-Direct acts as an extension of customers’ own internal systems enabling 
collaborative planning, work in progress tracking, engineering data sharing, real-time 
order placement, confirmation and other important business control features.  
Through the use of TSMC-YES, TSMC’s customers can perform yield enhancement 
analysis remotely from their workstations or PCs using exactly the same tools, data and 
models as those employed by TSMC’s engineers. This aims to promote engineering 
collaboration between TSMC and its customers in order to achieve shorter yield analysis 
cycles, improved yield enhancement efficiencies and faster ramp to production. In addition, 
TSMC-ILW and eJobView are specifically instrumental in design collaboration. 
TSMC-ILV is a real-time web-based distributed layout information viewing service 
providing an engineering collaboration platform for communicating on layout issues. 
Through these means, designers can interactively review, navigate, highlight and 
discuss layout issues with TSMC’s service engineers. As a result, it may be possible to 
achieve improved design productivity, lower engineering and debugging costs, and faster 
time-to-market.  
TSMC’s eJobView is a mask inspection software system – the first of its kind in the 
foundry industry – which allows external customers to view mask images anytime or 
anywhere through their favorite web browser. Foundry mask data sign-off previously 
involved several days of inspection and discussion, and even expensive air travel costs for 
international customers. In contrast, through the use of eJobView, mask image inspection is 
immediate, with remote teams now able to discuss critical projects in real time, leading to 
faster time to tape-out, lower development costs and faster time to volume.  
  18 In order to facilitate design collaboration, TSMC has also formed a Design Service 
Alliance with third parties. As mentioned earlier, the emergence of SOC has highlighted 
the importance of SIPs, and as a result, IC design has come to resemble the assembly of 
SIPs, from both internal and external sources. Design houses are also faced with the 
challenge of choosing from amongst a variety of library suppliers and Electronic Design 
Aid (EDA) tools. TSMC previously functioned as a pure-play foundry with limited design 
service capacity, but with Design Service Alliance, the company can now mobilize external 
resources to facilitate the design processes of its customers.  
Design Service Alliance encompasses the four service areas that make up the IC design 
process - third party libraries, silicon-verified IPs, experienced IC designers and proven 
EDA software. A network of leading third party library vendors form the core of the 
Library Alliance enabling TSMC’s customers to gain access to required technical services, 
leading edge process-specific technologies and documents on design requirements. IP 
Alliance encompasses a large category of silicon-verified and production-proven foundry 
specific IPs, which are useful for designers in IP assembly.  
Through the Design Center Alliance, TSMC helps its customers to connect to a global 
network of qualified and experienced IC design centers in order to gain the necessary 
design expertise. Similarly, through the EDA Alliance, TSMC’s design service engineers 
work with EDA Alliance members in order to deliver TSMC-specific technology files and 
design kits that may simplify its customers’ design experience. In essence, the Design 
Service Alliance as a whole aims to provide TSMC’s customers with total IC design 
solutions to accelerate cycle time from specification, through tape-out, to finished wafers. 
Both TSMC’s customers and the key testing and packaging firms can gain access to the 
Design Service Alliance using TSMC-Online as the platform. 
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through CyberShuttle. First launched in October 1998, CyberShuttle allows multiple 
customers to share the costs of a single mask set and prototype in a pilot run. It aims to help 
customers to reduce substantially their non-recurring engineering (NRE) charges for small 
wafer volume, providing fast and cost-effective prototyping. According to TSMC, 
Cybershuttle will launch 93 multi-project wafers during 2001, with the first half alone 
almost matching the 50 shuttles launched throughout the whole of last year.  
To summarize, whilst starting out as a stand-alone OEM foundry, TSMC has come to 
resemble a provider of integrated service packages covering a wide range of value chain 
management activities thanks to its extensive application of e-commerce. Basically, 
through its arms-length relationship with its customers, TSMC is not just a pure 
manufacturer, it has become the natural place to verify the manufacturability of its 
customers’ designs and to ensure the quality and timely delivery of their finished wafers. 
The ability of the electronic Internet and e-commerce links to accelerate and broaden 
information transfer between TSMC and its customers not only helps to simplify their tasks 
of knowledge management and exchange, but also induces TSMC to widen the scope of its 
extended supply chain management activities.  
In a sense, the method of e-commerce employed by TSMC, or more specifically 
TSMC-Online, acts as a portal providing comprehensive support for its customers’ major 
operational tasks, ranging from prototyping and design, to engineering and logistics.  In 
terms of design, aided by its B2B Internet applications, TSMC has drawn on a portfolio of 
design solutions from third parties to help its customers to achieve better designs, more 
reliable design reuse and faster time-to-market, leading to virtual integration of a network 
of firms.  
  20 In TSMC’s B2B e-commerce model, goods and cash flows are secondary to 
information flows. As a pure-play foundry, its inventory costs for finished products are not 
an important issue, whereas in contrast, customer relationship management is regarded as 
central to TSMC’s operations as a means of securing its rates of capacity utilization and 
profitability. In addition, from their own viewpoint, B2B e-commerce is essential in order 
for foundries to come to terms with the trend towards SOC. Therefore, TSMC’s 
e-commerce initiatives aim to meet the across-the-broad needs of its customers, in order to 
enhance customer loyalty.  
It is possible to identify the operational impact of TSMC’s e-commerce, but its 
strategic significance has to be interpreted in a wider context of inter-firm relationships. In 
operational terms, TSMC was able to deliver WIP reports three times a day in 1998, whilst 
a Korean counterpart at that time managed to do this only once a week. Nowadays, 
TSMC’s WIP reporting is real-time. In addition, thanks to e-commerce, order confirmation 
in TSMC can now be completed in two seconds, as compared to two days in the past. 
Furthermore, TSMC’s e-commerce applications enable it to provide tailored packages for 
its customer that include design support, cell library, IP, quality/reliability as well as 
process technology and wafer capacity. As a result, its customers can ‘virtually’ own a 
foundry, providing a total solution, by leveraging TSMC’s internal and external resources. 
In this way, TSMC has set the rules of the game for the industry, which dictate that foundry 
must go beyond manufacturing muscle to become an essential platform for its customers to 
gain access to across-the-board competencies. TSMC’s case proves that e-commerce 
applications can be a fertile ground for building up this new comparative advantage. 
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Taiwan’s achievements in high-tech production can be better understood by the ability of 
local firms to leverage and align local and international networks. The industrial structures 
of the island’s PC and IC sectors are both characterized by vertical disintegration but with 
strong linkages between local firms and across national borders. The agglomeration effect 
of industrial clusters helps to create the momentum for the development of local industries 
in Taiwan and, to the extent that the local networks become part of the global network, the 
local industries are given additional ammunition for development.  More importantly, the 
use of IT has helped these Taiwanese firms to closely integrate themselves into the global 
production networks.  
The two cases of Mitac and TSMC differ in a couple of aspects. Firstly, in the case of 
Mitac, the brand marketers, such as Compaq, took the initiative in shaping the global 
production network and in deploying IT integration within it. In contrast, TSMC appeared 
to play a more active role in this respect, since the company considered virtual integration 
as an evitable response to the emerging call for SOC. Secondly, in terms of 
inter-organizational and cross-border supply-chain integration, goods flows are no less 
important than information flows in the case of Mitac, and for the PC industry in general. 
However, for TSMC, such goods flows are secondary to information flows. This helps to 
explain why TSMC chose to take part in managing global production and knowledge 
networks, even though its production function is currently concentrated in Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, the two organizations do have some things in common. First of all, both 
of the companies have evolved from stand-alone OEM manufacturers towards providers of 
integrated service packages encompassing a wider range of value-chain activities than 
manufacturing. By fine-tuning its international operations in a global logistics way and 
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coordination of cross-border supply chains and logistics. Similarly, TSMC exploits its 
unique position in the IC industry to act as a portal providing comprehensive support for its 
customers’ major operational tasks, ranging from prototyping, design and engineering, to 
logistics. In so doing, both of them have become an essential node of their respective 
global production networks. 
Of equal importance is the formation of the global production networks that have 
resulted in new rules of the games for the two industries, towards which, both Mitac and 
TSMC have contributed in part. Central to global logistics is the subcontractors’ ability to 
weave together the cross-national constituent elements of the value chain into a 
competitively effective and rapidly responsive production and logistics system. Therefore, 
industrial competition within the PC industry relies not just on lower costs, but also on 
rapid response capabilities and flexibility. In the case of TSMC, emphasis is placed on the 
tailored services packages provided to its customers, which include design support, cell 
library, SIP, quality/reliability, as well as process technology and wafer capacity. TSMC 
has thus dictated the new rules of the game, that foundry must go beyond manufacturing 
muscle to become an essential platform for its customers to gain access to across-the-board 
competencies. In light of all these factors, the essence of IT application is to facilitate 
networked firms participating in setting the rules of the game for industrial competition, 
preferably in the international arena.  
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